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I. INTRODUCTION
Valuing the rate base has always been a contentious part of utility
regulation. Over the last one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
endorsed both original cost and fair-market valuation. At other times, the
Court has chosen not to review the valuation method as long as the
resulting overall financial performance of the company was reasonable.
The latest valuation controversy stems from the introduction of
competition into the telecommunications arena via the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (1996 Act).' Competition has required the unbundling and
wholesale pricing of network elements. Wholesale pricing, in turn, requires
significant2
value has created
valuing network elements. Determining this
•
•
controversy. On the one hand, incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)
argue that in order to provide adequate return on invested capital, elements
should be valued at original cost. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), however, in an effort to promote competition, urges
valuing network elements based on forward-looking costs.3 No doubt the
Supreme Court will provide considerable guidance toward the eventual
outcome of this issue.
This Article discusses rate-base valuation, total element long run
incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing, and the Court's opinion generally on
the issue of takings. Part El begins by examining the pricing rules devised
by the FCC under the 1996 Act to promote competition and the ILECs'
objections to those rules. The FCC argues that forward-looking TELRIC

1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 47

U.S.C.).
2. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Implementation of Local Competition]. An "Incumbent Local Exchange
Carrier" is defined as:
With respect to an area, the local exchange carrier that: (1) on February 8, 1996,
provided telephone exchange service in such area; and (2)(i) on February 8, 1996,
was deemed to be a member of the exchange carrier association pursuant to
[section] 69.601(b) of this chapter, or (ii) is a person or entity that, on or after
February 8, 1996, became a successor or assign of a member described in clause
(i) of this paragraph.
Id. at 16,199.
3. See id. at para. 679.
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prices are economically efficient and promote competition.4 The ILECs
contend that if prices are set at a level equal to TELRIC plus a reasonable
share of joint and coipmon costs, these prices will:
[D]eny them recoupment through unbundled network revenues of all
historic and/or embedded costs and profit, contrary to the reasonable
investment expectations of their investors. To ensure that a taking does
not occur, the ILECs argue that the pricing methodology must
guarantee the 5recovery of all prudently incurred costs of investing in
local network.
To help resolve these conflicting viewpoints, this Article then turns to
the Supreme Court's response to the takings question posed earlier in the
twentieth century. Part III of this Article discusses the development of the
"Fair Value' doctrine and its eventual abandonment in Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 6 In Hope, the Court made it clear
that it was not willing to review the rate-base valuation process as long as
the end result-the financial viability of the company-was adequate.
Following similar reasoning, adoption of TELRIC-based pricing may be
acceptable as long as companies maintain their financial integrity. The
issue of TELRIC and financial viability is examined more deeply in the rest
of this Article.
Part IV looks more carefully at TELRIC pricing and some of the
concerns the Supreme Court has already expressed about its adoption. Part
IV argues that TELRIC may be no more hypothetical than other pricing
standards and that the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) and
large ILECs have been advocating TELRIC-like pricing for some time. Part
IV also makes the point that TELRIC may be no more subjective than other
pricing standards such as Ramsey pricing or efficient compound pricing
rule (ECPR). Furthermore, both methods require a regulatory commission
to estimate the forward looking economic cost of production.
Part V focuses on whether TERLIC pricing does indeed lead to a
taking according to the standard espoused by the Hope Court. While there
has been a lot of discussion of this issue in law journals, 8 the question of

4. See id.
5. E. Sanderson Hoe & Stephen Ruscus, Taking Aim at the Takings Argument: Using
Forward-looking Pricing Methodologies to Price Unbundled Network Elements, 5
CoMMLAw CONSPEcrus 231, 239 (1997) (footnotes omitted); see also Reply Testimony of

Irene G. Chavira at 22, Interconnection Contract Negotiations Between AT&T Comm. of
the Mountain States, Inc. and U S WEST Comm., Inc. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252, (N.M.
State Corp. Comm'n Mar. 27, 1997) (No. 96-41 1-TC).

6. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
7. See id.at 603.
8. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require
that We Kill the Competitive Goose? PricingLocal Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L.
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whether or not a taking has occurred is largely an empirical issue. This
Article presents data on the rate of return on the regulated earnings of

selected local exchange companies since the passage of the 1996 Act. The
companies selected are arguably firms that ought to have experienced the
greatest harm from TELRIC-based prices for unbundled network elements.
They deaverage costs by density zone yet engage in value of service
pricing. The data indicate that the majority of these companies are

experiencing more than adequate rates-of-return on regulated capital, a
condition that contradicts the ILECs' argument that TELRIC-based prices
are confiscatory. Furthermore, recent evidence on the sale of exchanges
indicate that the market price for ILEC exchanges is greater than their book
value, a clear sign that investors are being adequately compensated for their

initial investment.
IX. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
On February 8, 1996, the 1996 Act was signed into law. The 1996 Act
is a comprehensive overhaul of the Communications Act of 1934, making
significant changes in the law affecting the regulation of broadcasting,
cable, and telephony with less extensive
changes in9 satellite and spectrum
•
regulation and in the FCC's own internal processes.
Broadly speaking, the intent and purpose of the 1996 Act was "to

provide for a procompetitive, deregulatory national policy framework
designed to rapidly accelerate private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all
Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition" °
thereby securing "lower prices and higher quality services for American
REV. 1122 (1998); William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, DeregulatoryTakings,Breach
of the Regulatory Contract,and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1037 (1997); Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV., 1535
(1999); Hoe & Ruscus, supra note 5; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation
and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998); J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacyof Forward-looking

Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy
of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract,71 N.Y.U.
L. RFv. 851 (1996); Stephen F. Williams, Responses Deregulatory Takings and Breach of
the Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1000 (1996); Oliver E.
Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some
Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory

Takings,77 TEx. L. REV. 297 (1998) (book review).
9. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (1996).

10. 142 CONG. REc. HI 154 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
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telecommunications consumers......1
One of the principle goals of the 1996 Act regarding the provision of
telephone service was to open the local exchange and exchange access
markets to competitive entry. 2 In advancing this goal the interconnection
section of the 1996 Act, section 251 imposes several obligations on the
ILECs. Three important obligations include the following: First, ILECs
have a duty to enable competitors to interconnect with the ILECs network,
for the transmission and routing of exchange service and exchange access,
at any technically feasible point within the network. 3 These services must
be offered at rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory. 14 Second, ILECs must provide unbundled network
elements (UNEs) to competitors at any technically feasible point within the
network. UNEs must be provided in a manner enabling them to be
combined to provide telecommunications service and at rates, terms, and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.'5 Finally,
ILECs must offer all their retail services for resale by competitors at
wholesale rates.'
The FCC has devised pricing rules to implement the provisions of the
Act. These rules are among the more contentious issues surrounding the
FCC's rulemaking procedures for the full implementation of the Act. In
particular, as noted in the introduction, it is the FCC's adoption of the
TELRIC Plus methodology for the pricing of unbundled elements and
interconnection that has given rise to multiple constitutional challenges by
the ILECs and their supporters.
According to the FCC, its TELRIC Plus methodology is a forwardlooking pricing methodology that replicates how competitive markets
actually operate and best approximates what it would actually cost an
efficient, competitive firm to produce UNEs. 7 The TELRIC Plus pricing of
UNEs, as set forth by the FCC, will, according to the FCC and its
supporters, adequately compensate the ILECs for all forward-looking costs
of providing UNEs, including the costs of capital and provides for a
reasonable allocation of joint and common costs."' Proponents of TELRIC
11. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. I 1996).
12. See Implementation of Local Competition, 1IF.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 3, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).
13. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (Supp. I11996).

14.
15.
16.
17.

§ 251(c)(2)(D).
See id.
See id.
§ 251(c)(3).
See id§ 251(c)(4).
See Implementation of Local Competition, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 679,4 Comm.

Reg. (P &F) 1.
18. See id. at paras. 679-98,700.
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aver that, because prices are driven to forward-looking costs in competitive
markets, "the TELRIC Plus methodology is intended and expected to

provide ILECs with a constitutionally sufficient approximation of the fair
market value of their property in a competitive market."' 9
One of the principle ILEC objections to the TELRIC method is that,
because it is a forward-looking costing methodology, it fails to permit the
recovery of "historical" and "embedded" costs, or, in the language of the
regulatory battles of an earlier era, fails to permit the recovery of an ILEC's
"prudent investment" in its physical
2 plant and infrastructure and so
constitutes a taking of ILEC property. 1
'2
The "fair value"21 methodology and the "prudent investment
methodology (the latter sometimes referred to as "historical" or
"embedded '' 23 cost methodology) have been variously praised and damned
by ratemakers, ratepayers, and the regulated industries over the years.2
19. Hoe & Ruscus, supra note 5, at 236 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Implementation of Local Competition, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 670, 4

Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1; Joint Motion of GTE Corp. and the Southern New England Tel. Co.
for Stay Pending Judicial Review at 12-13, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telcomms. Act of 1996, Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 11,754, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 980 (1996) (No. 96-98); Hoe & Ruscus, supranote 5, at 239.
21. In the public utility context, "fair value" is generally understood to refer to the
present value of property-tangible and intangible-that is used and useful in providing a
public service. Although no clear definition for fair value exists, it is interpreted as "a figure
somewhere between original cost and reproduction cost, arrived at by the exercise of
'enlightened judgement."' CHAiU..Es F. PHILLiPs, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTLT
319 (1993). The courts generally lean toward the use of reproduction costs as the standard
for fair value. See id.
22. One definition of prudent investment is "capital reasonably expended to meet the
utility's legal obligation to assure adequate service." Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299, 317 (1989). Some consider prudent investment synonymous with historical cost as
evidenced by Justice Brandeis's statement: "Historical cost, i.e., the proper cost of the
existing plant and business, estimated on the basis of the price levels existing at the
respective dates when the plant and the additions were constructed. This is often called
prudent investment." Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 295 n.6 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. "Embedded or accounting costs are costs that firms incurred in the past for
providing a good or service and are recorded as past operating expenses and depreciation."
Implementation of Local Competition, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 675, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &

F) 1.
24. Broadly speaking, supporters of the "prudent investment" rule believe that the
Constitution ensures public utilities and their investors a fair return on the capital prudently
invested in providing services to the public. Specifically, the Constitution "guarantees an
opportunity to earn [compensation equal to] the reasonable cost of conducting the business."
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 291. Supporters of the fair value rule, on the other
hand, believe that it is the utility property-tangible and intangible-currently in use and
useful for the purpose of providing the public service that is protected by the Constitution.
In sum, the Constitution protects the present value of the property used and useful in
providing the public service, which is also known as the fair value.
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These groups, wavering in their preferences as political and economic
expediency dictated, have from time to time shifted in their support for any
particular methodology?25
The Supreme Court, in trying to make sense of these shifts, and the
resultant slings and arrows of constitutional takings challenges and
counterchallenges hurled during the various ratemaking conflicts of the
twentieth century, has observed that "neither law nor economics has yet
devised generally accepted standards for the evaluation of ratemaking
orders 26 and has, in recent years, sensibly refused to elevate any particular
methodology to the level of constitutional mandate, choosing instead to
focus its efforts on the overall effects of regulation.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been drawn into the TELRIC
controversy. On January 25, 1999, the Court issued its decision in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard.27 The Supreme Court held that the FCC had
jurisdiction to establish pricing methodologies for state commissions to
apply in arbitrations under sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act. Due to
the jurisdictional nature of the appeal, however, the Court did not address
the merits of the FCC's TELRIC methodology for pricing UNEs or its
avoided cost methodology for services subject to resale.
Challenges to the merits of the FCC pricing rules are currently
pending before the Eighth Circuit. "Meanwhile, at least thirty-five states
have independently approved a TELRIC unbundled elements pricing
methodology. Of these states, at least fifteen are being sued for approving
forward-looking
cost incremental pricing for unbundled network
' 29
elements.

25. In his dissenting opinion in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Justice Brandeis made

explicit reference to the self-serving nature of rate-making advocacy by noting that "It]he
rule by which the utilities are seeking to measure the return is, in essence, reproduction cost
of the utility or prudent investment, whichever is the higher." 262 U.S. at 311 (emphasis
added). For more on the political nature of the judiciary's choice between prudent
investment and reproduction cost theories, see Stephen A. Siegal, Understanding the
Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70
VA. L. REv. 187,219-23 (1984).
26. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,790 (1968).

27. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999) (affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th

Cir. 1997)).
28. See AT&T Corp., 119 S. Ct. at 728 n.3.
29. Paul W. Garnett, Forward-lookingCosting Methodologiesand the Supreme Court's
Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 7 COMMLAw CONSpECrUS 119, 132 (1999) (footnotes

omitted).
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][]. A SHORT HISTORY OF CRYTERIA RELID UPON BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT A TAKING

HAS OCCURRED
The Supreme Court will unavoidably be drawn into the valuation
question as the advocacy for TELRIC pricing spreads. Hence, it is useful to
examine how the Court responded to changes in valuation paradigms in the
past.

A.

FairValue Ratemaking

The fair value doctrine saw its inception in 1897 with the Supreme
Court's opinion regarding a Nebraska freight-hauling rate case, Smyth v.
Ames." Justice Harlan wrote:
The corporation may not be required to use its property for the benefit
of the public without receiving just compensation for the services
rendered by it ....What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return
upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience.31
Justice Harlan did not clearly define how "the fair value of the property
being used' 32 was to be determined. He did suggest, however, that in
ascertaining
[T]hat value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds
and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of
construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under
particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet
operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be
given such weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say
that there may not be33 other matters to be regarded in estimating the
value of the property.
Despite the fact that Smyth suggested that all factors bearing upon
value and cost should be considered by ratemaking bodies in making a fair
value determination of a utility's property, focus quickly narrowed to two
factors: the original and reproduction cost of useful property. Fair value
came to be interpreted as an uncertain combination of these two costs,
albeit with the courts leaning toward an emphasis on reproduction costs as

30. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The 1893 panic that brought prices to nearly the lowest level
reached in the nineteenth century prompted the courts to adopt present value (fair value).
Insistence upon reproduction cost was the shippers' protest against burdens believed to have
resulted from watered stocks, reckless financing, and unconscionable construction contracts.
See Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 262 U.S. at 298.
31. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546-47.
32. Mdt
at 546.
33. Id.
at 547.
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the standard of fair value.3
While reproduction costs might have been considered a theoretically
sound method for valuing the rate base, it suffered from practical problems
and was not operable at the state regulatory level. Engineering estimates
required to estimate the cost of reproduction were inexact by definition and
often contradictory. 35 Furthermore, when presented with a company's
present valuation study of its physical plant, many state commissions were
financially incapable of undertaking an independent appraisal to verify the
study as such appraisals were extremely expensive and time consuming.
For example, in a telephone rate case, the Minnesota Commission
undertook an exhaustive physical valuation of the telephone plant in
question that required three years and almost one million dollars in
expenditures by the state and company to complete. 36
34. See EMERY TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBUc UTELIms 794 (1947); see also C.
WOODY THOMPSON & WENDELL R. SMrIH, PUBLIc UTILITY ECONOMICS 209, 362-63 (1941).
At times, the utilities shared the court's ambiguity when presenting their petitions for rate
relief. "The telephone company does not distinctly say what it considers a correct earnings
basis." Michigan State Telephone Company, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR), 1923A, at 70 (Mich.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n July 13, 1922). Frequently, the telephone company offered a valuation
estimate based on both procedures. They leaned toward the use of reproduction cost, which
is the cost of reproducing the presently used and useful property at current costs. Typically,
one or more engineers conduct an appraisal of the physical property to determine this cost,
adding land valuations, amount of working capital, certain intangible values, and an
allowance for going value.
Neoclassical economists justify applying reproduction cost because it most accurately
represents the workings of a competitive economy. In the long ran, a competitive economy
will provide a service at the cost of providing the service. If the price of the service is above
cost, entry will occur. Entry will continue until the price is driven down to the cost of a new
entrant providing a perfectly substitutable service. Conversely, firms will leave the market if
the price is below the cost of providing service. Economists further argue that basing the
cost of service on the reproductive cost provides greater rate flexibility than use of historical
costs. Historical costs tend to keep prices low during periods of inflation, encouraging
overuse of the utility service. Conversely, during deflationary periods, rates based on
historical cost will be greater than those justified by use of reproductive cost, leading to
unnecessarily low use of the phone system.
35. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 299-302. Justice Brandeis noted:
In Matin Municipal Water District, the several valuations of five experts were:
$670,163; $723,001.85; $763,028; $919,204; $1,031,436. In Springfield v.
Springfield Gas & Electric Co., the several valuations of five experts were[:]
$547,488; $588,262; $806,404; $898,785; $940,988. In Duluth Street [Railway]
Co. v. Railroad [CommissionJ, the valuations of two experts, both employed by
the [s]tate were $600,000 and $1,100,000.
Id. at 299 n.1I (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
36. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Comm'n, Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1923B, 117-20 (Neb.
State Ry. Comm'n Nov. 4, 1922); see also Wisconsin Tel. Co., Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR)
1927A, 581, 584-85 (Wis. ILR.Comm'n Nov. 23, 1926); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n of Ga., Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1925A, 546, 584-5 (D.N.D. Ga. Sept. 25,
1924); Bell Water Co., Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 1925D, 1, 6 (Cal. R.R. Conm'n Jan. 17,
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The Evolution to HistoricalCost Ratemaking

The Sinyth rule held sway from 1898 to 1942. In the early years of
this period, the Court adhered to an interpretation of the fair value doctrine
which allowed state commissions to use a combination of reproduction cost
and original cost in determining the fair value of the rate base. However, by
the early decades of the 1900s, fair value
had come to be consistently tied
37
to some estimate of reproduction cost.
In one gas case, for example, the Court wrote "[i]f the property,
which legally enters into the consideration of the question of rates, has
increased in value since it was acquired, the company is entitled to the
benefit of such increase. ' ,38 The Court further illuminated its acceptance of
reproduction cost in another gas case. The majority argued that the utility
uses the property to produce output. Therefore, it is the property itself that
provides value and the property that requires valuation. If property value
can be reduced judicially due to reckless or imprudent investment, then
[Tihe maling of a just return for the use of the property involves the
recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost. The property is
held in private ownership and it is that property, and not the original
cost of39it, of which the owner may not be deprived without due process
of law.

In a West Virginia water case, the Court again defended fair value
measured as the current value of property. The Court wrote:
Rates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value
of the property used at the time it is being used to render the service
are unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory .... This is so well settled
by numerous decisions
of this Court that citation of the cases is
4
scarcely necessary. 0
What is noteworthy about the Court's behavior during this period are
the two philosophical tenets maintained by the Court in its explorations
concerning the determination of fair value. The first was a refusal to adopt
reproduction cost as the controlling measure of fair value. The second was

1925).
In current dollars, this is equivalent to approximately nine million dollars. Due to the
advent of computerized database systems and the availability of highly developed computer
modeling techniques, performing a similar study today would be far less expensive.
37. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 262 U.S. 276; Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of Pa., 291 U.S. 227 (1934); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272
U.S. 400 (1926).
38. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19,52 (1909).
39. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352,454 (1913).
40. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W. Va.,
262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923).
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a refusal to adopt a precise formula for calculating fair value.41
Starting around 1923, a minority on the Supreme Court began
advocating for an alternative to the fair value rule of Smyth. 2 Their
preference was for a rate base calculated using original cost. In
recommending this valuation method, Justice Brandeis, writing in a
telephone case, argued for the use of prudent investment which he
measured as original cost minus any fraudulent, unwise, or extravagant
expenditure. He apparently had two motives for wanting to value the rate
base in this fashion. The first was his belief that it is the capital invested,
not the property itself, on which investors should earn a return: "The thing
devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible
or intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so
invested the [Federal43Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity
to earn a fair return."
Brandeis's second motive for questioning the majority's fair value
doctrine was his concern about the inherent instability and speculation
associated with a valuation method that tried to value at current prices, a
plan that was put into place years before the rate-hearing. As he noted in
his dissent in Southwestern Bell:
The experience of the twenty-five years since [Smyth v. Ames] has
demonstrated that the rule there enunciated is delusive. In the attempt
to apply it, insuperable obstacles have been encountered. It has failed
to afford adequate protection either to capital or to the public.... [I]t
is essential that the rate base be definite, stable, and readily
ascertainable.44
Brandeis argued that using a prescribed, tractable rate valuation method,
such as prudent investment, would bring less ambiguity and arbitrariness to
the process: "The doubts and uncertainties incident to the [determination of
the rate base and rate of return] can be eliminated, or lessened, only by
redefining the rate base, called value, and the measure
of fairness of return,
45
now applied under the rule of Smyth v. Ames."
41. In MinnesotaRate Cases,for example, in valuing the rate base the Court concluded:

"The ascertainment of that value is not controlled by artificial rules. It is not a matter of
formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgement having its basis in a proper
consideration of all relevant facts." 230 U.S. at 434.
42. It is suggestive that the beginning of this advocacy period coincided with the

inflationary period attending World War L A time during which "state utility commissions,

while admitting the evidence in obedience to Smyth v. Ames, failed, in ever-increasing
numbers, to pay heed to it in fixing the rate base." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at

301.
43. Id.
at 290.
44. Id. at 292.
45. Id.In Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of
West Virginia, Justice Brandeis concurs in the judgment of reversal for the same reasons
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Justice Stone's dissent in another case (joined by Brandeis and
Cardozo) is reflective of the minority's lack of faith in accurately
estimating reproduction cost. Justice Stone wrote:
In assuming the task of determining judicially the present fair
replacement value of the vast properties of public utilities, courts have
been projected into the most speculative undertaking imposed upon
them in the entire history of English jurisprudence . . . When we
arrive at a theoretical value based upon some uncertain and figurative
data we gain at best only an illusory certainty. No court can evolve
from its inner consciousness the answer to the question whether the
illusion of certainty will invariably be better supported by a study of
the actual cost of the property adjusted to price trends, or by a study of
the estimates of
46 engineers based upon data which never have existed
and never will.
Stone and Brandeis also dissented in a rate case involving a water
utility in Indiana. 47 The tone of their dissenting opinion was again that
estimates of reproduction cost are speculative. In another water case,
Justice Black wrote:
Wherever the question of utility valuation arises today, it is
exceedingly difficult to discern the truth through the maze of formulas
and the jungle of metaphysical concepts sometimes conceived, and
often fostered, by the ingenuity of those who seek inflated valuations
to support excessive rates. Even the testimony of engineers, with wide
experience in developing this theory and expounding it to courts, is not
in agreement as to the meaning of the vague and uncertain terms
created to add invisible and intangible values to actual physical
property. Completely lost in the confusion of language-too frequently
invented for the purpose of confusing-commissions and courts
passing upon rates for public utilities are driven to listen to
conjectures, speculations estimates[,] and guesses, all under the name
of "reproduction costs." V
By the late 1930s, power in the Court was shifting toward Brandeis's
view of rate-base valuation. Justices Cardozo and Brandeis left in 1938 and
1939, respectively. Justice Butler, a leading advocate of reproduction cost
valuation, left the Court in 1939, as well. The three replacements-Felix
Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy-all eventually
supported the prudent investment method of valuation. The combination of
these three additional justices with Justices Stone and Black, who had
consistently joined in dissents extolling prudent investment as a means of
rate-base valuation, swung the majority of the Court in support of the
stated in his dissenting opinion in the Southwestern Bell case. See Bluefield Water Works
Improvement Co., 262 U.S. at 695.
46. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689-90 (1935).
47. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
48. McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419,428-29 (1937).
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prudent investment method.
There were two landmark cases that firmly established the Court's
recognition of prudent investment as a constitutionally valid means of
valuation. The first involved a natural gas company that extracted gas from
Texas and transported it to Illinois where it was sold at wholesale to utility
companies. 49 The Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Stone
established two important points. One is that the Court would not set aside
Federal Power Commission (FPC) established rates the Court deemed
"reasonable." Justice Stone wrote:
[Tihe [FC] is also free under [section] 5(a) [of the Natural Gas Act]
to decrease any rate which is not the "lowest reasonable rate." It
follows that the [c]ongressional standard prescribed by this statute
coincides with that of the Constitution, and that the courts are without
authority under the statute to set aside as too low any "reasonable rate"
adopted by the [FCC] which is consistent with constitutional
requirements.
The second point is that if the Court found that rates were "just and
reasonable" then it would not proceed with further inquiry into the method
of valuing the rate base that produced those rates. Again, from the Court's
opinion, Stone wrote "[i]f the [FCC]'s order, as applied to the facts before
it and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at
an end."51 The general interpretation of this opinion was that prudent
investment could be used as long as it generated rates that were just and
reasonable.
The second case, and the one that firmly established the validity of
prudent investment, was also a gas case. Hope Natural Gas, a company
wholly owned by Standard Oil, distributed natural gas in Ohio and
Pennsylvania. Officials in those states asked the FPC to use its authority to
review rates charged by Hope. The FPC considered the matter and
eventually ruled that Hope should lower its rates, as they were not the
lowest reasonable rates. This ruling was based, in part, on valuing the rate
base at its "actual legitimate cost!' (prudent investment). The court of
appeals set aside the ruling, arguing that the rate base should reflect present
fair value. The appellate court went on to assert that the FPC should have
considered reproduction cost and trended original cost in its valuation and
that prudent investment was not the proper measure of fair value.5 3
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Douglas,
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
Id. at 586.
Id.
See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
See id. at599-601.
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disagreed with the appellate court's decision. Mirroring the Natural Gas
Pipeline opinion, Douglas wrote:
Under the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the result
reached not the method employed which is controlling ....It is not
theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect
of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial
inquiry under the Act is at an end.5
Douglas's disdain for the fair value rate base is evidenced further in
the opinion. After reviewing financial performance statistics for the
company, he wrote:
In view of these various considerations we cannot say that an
annual return [supported by the [FPC]'s original cost rate ruling] is not
"just and reasonable" within the meaning of the Act. Rates which
enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial
integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks
assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they
might5 5produce only a meager return on the so-called "fair value" rate
base.
With the Hope decision, the Court was accepting the constitutional
validity of the use of prudent investment valuation as long as it maintained
the financial viability of the utilities. More significantly, however, the Hope
decision made it plain that the Court was eschewing the elevation of any
particular ratemaking methodology to the level of constitutional status.
Hope marked a shift in the Court's analytical emphasis. Henceforth,
the Court would no longer narrowly focus on the particular regulatory
method employed in rate-making. The object of analysis was now to be on
the overall effects of regulation. 56 Of course, one result of this decision, and
one which is important for the discussion in Part V, is that "the embedded
or prudent investment costing methodology upheld in Hope Natural Gas is
no more susceptible to a Takings Clause challenge than the forwardlooking or 'fair value' costing methodology upheld in
Smyth v. Ames,
'
which 'mimics the operation of the competitive market."'
The findings of the Hope Court were strongly reaffirmed by the Court
in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.55 In his majority opinion Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
Forty-five years ago in the landmark case ofFPCv. Hope Natural Gas
Co., this Court ... held that the "fair value" rule is not the only
constitutionally acceptable method of fixing utility rates .... Today we
54. Id,
at 602 (citations omitted).
55. l. at 605.
56. See id. at 602.
57. Garnett, supra note 29, at 129 (footnote omitted).

58. 488 U.S. 299,310 (1989).
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reaffirm these teachings of Hope Natural Gas: "[I]t is not theory but
the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate
order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry... is at an
end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may
contain infirmities is not then important. 5 9
The Court went on to buttress the Hope Court's decision to refrain
from elevating any one ratemaking methodology to the level of a
constitutional standard. In a strongly worded statement the majority of the
Court refused the Pennsylvania Electric Association's suggestion that the
prudent investment rule be adopted as the constitutional standard:
The adoption of a single theory of valuation as a constitutional
requirement would be inconsistent with the view of the Constitution
this Court has taken since Hope NaturalGas (citation omitted) .... As
demonstrated in Wisconsin v. FPC,circumstances may favor the use of
one ratemaking procedure over another. The designation of a single
theory of ratemaking as a constitutional requirement would
unnecessarily foreclose alternatives which could benefit both
consumers and investors. 6°
The judicial theory of valuation espoused in Hope may be extended to
TELRIC pricing. In essence, TELRIC is just another valuation method. The
court has consistently avoided selecting one valuation method over another.
The lesson of Hope is that the court will refrain from reviewing the
valuation method as long as the end result is just and reasonable. Hence,
the reasonable conclusion is that TELRIC should not be objectionable if the
end result it produces is just and reasonable. Part V examines the result of
recent TELRIC valuations. But first, this Article addresses some of the
other concerns raised by the court with respect to TELRIC pricing.

IV. IMPACT Op THE 1996 ACT
Significantly, the majority noted that a rigid insistence on the prudent
investment rule "would also foreclose a return to some form of the fair
value rule just as its practical problems may be diminishing.' 61 It is to a
discussion of the diminishment of these problems to which this Article now
turns.

59. Id. at 310 (1989) (quoting Hope, 320 U.S. at 602) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 316. In a recent ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that
"Duquesne stands for the proposition that 'no single ratemaking methodology is mandated
by the Constitution, which looks to the consequences a governmental authority produces
rather than the techniques it employs."' Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393, 437 (5th Cir. 1999). In regards to the deregulatory takings issue, the court
concluded that "Duquesne does not require courts to engage in a takings analysis whenever
an agency opens a previously regulated market to competition." l
61. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,316 n.10 (1989).
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TELRIC, FairValue, and the Problemsof EstimatingForwardlooking Costs
If the aim were to ascertain the value (in its ordinary sense) of the
utility property, the enquiry would be, not what it would cost to
reproduce the identical property, but what it would cost to establish a
plant which could render the service, or in other words,
at what cost
62
could an equally efficient substitute be then produced.

In his criticism of the FCC's TELRIC pricing system in the Supreme
Court's recent AT&T Corp. decision Justice Breyer noted that:
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, pointed out the drawback
of using a forward-looking, rather than an actual historic, cost system
many years ago. They wrote that whatever the theoretical economic
merits of a "reproduction cost" system (a system bearing an uncanny
resemblance to the FCC's choice), the hypothetical nature of the
regulatory
it required made such a system administratively
63
unworkable.judgments
As regards the so-called "hypothetical nature of the regulatory
judgements" required for the implementation of the TELRIC methodology,
it is uncertain as to whether the factual inquiry required for the conduct of a
proper TELRIC study is any more hypothetical in nature than the
judgments called for in determining whether or not capital costs, some of
which were incurred decades ago, were "prudently" made or are "used and
useful." Both the prudent and used and useful standards require an agency
or a court to ascertaini the prospective demand for the products that will use
the utility's facilities, the cost of alternative technologies, and the life-cycle
costs of the facilities. All of these factors require considerable speculation
and by definition are hypothetical in nature. 4
62. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
312 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 752 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
64. If either the used and useful or prudent test is used to determine the reasonableness
of the embedded investment, a commission or an agency should account for the anticipated
demand for the facilities. Only if the anticipated revenue from the facilities exceed its cost,
can the facilities be deemed to be prudently invested or used and useful. See Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,309 (1989).
In the rapidly changing telecommunications industry, forecasting demand is no easy
task. There is a consensus in the telecommunications industry that little is known about the
demand for new telephone services. During a proceeding before the FCC, this view was
expressed by the local exchange carriers. The FCC proposed that telephone company usage
forecasts be used to allocate the cost of new investments between regulated and
nonregulated services, basing the allocation of common equipment on relative use during
the period when the nonregulated use reaches its highest occupancy rate during the
equipment's lifecycle. After public notice, the FCC instead chose to base cost allocations on
only three-year demand forecasts-a period significantly less than the economic life of most
outside plant and central office facilities. The suppliers of the new services informed the
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Second, Justice Brandeis never stated, nor can it be construed that he
implied, that estimating reproduction cost was a wholly valueless and
inappropriate enterprise. In fact, he noted that estimating reproduction cost
was useful and appropriate "as a means, either of supplying lacks in the
proof of actual cost and investment, or of testing the credibility of evidence
adduced, or of showing that the cost of installation had been wasteful," 65
and instances such as "when book values, or property accounts, furnish[]
no trustworthy evidence either of cost or of real value."6
Such a situation pertains today in regards to the pricing of UNEs and
interconnection. The ILECs and their allies, as has been noted in the
previous discussion, have advocated for the use of some form of the
prudent investment system in setting prices for UNEs and interconnection.
The problem with this methodology is that the accounting systems
currently used by the ILECs do not contain the data that is required for
making pricing decisions regarding the provision of UNEs and the pricing
of interconnection. These accounting systems were largely designed to
track the financial standing of the corporation. 67 Accounting data is
typically not maintained at a level of granularity that is sufficient for
determining the cost of individual components of the network or tariff
elements. This lack of detailed accounting data has long been recognized
by the telecommunications industry. For example, in 1980, AT&T and its
operating companies explained to the U.S. District Court why the Bell
System could not use accounting data to identify the cost of network
facilities or services:
With the advent of competition in the terminal equipment area, the
Bell System began efforts to determine the specific costs of the
individual components of basic exchange service, including the access
line, station, inside wire and usage. These costs were not contained in
the Uniform System of Accounts required for the telephone companies
FCC "that they cannot [reliably] forecast relative nonregulated and regulated usage over the
lengthy depreciation lives of most network plant." Separation of Costs of Regulated
Telephone Service from Costs of Nonregulated Activities Amendment of Part 31, the
Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and Class B Tel. Cos. to Provide for Nonregulated
Activities and to Provide for Transactions Between Telephone Cos. and Their Affiliates,
Orderon Reconsideration,2 F.C.C.R. 6283, para. 19, 64 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 47 (1987).
The FCC accepted the local exchange companies' position and remarked that long-term
forecasts are closer in method to "fortune-telling... [than] reasoned analyses." Id. at para.
41.
65. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 298-99.
66. Id. at 298.
67. "The Uniform System of Accounts focuses on company-wide financial and
operating data, rather than on individual service categories." Defendants' Third Statement of
Contentions and Proof at 825, United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980) (No.

74-1698).
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by the FCC and state regulatory commissions."

While it is possible to allocate embedded costs to different services,
these costs are not appropriate for making pricing decisions since the
historic costs analyzed may likely be different than the costs incurred as a
result of the pricing decision. Efficient
S69 allocation of resources requires that
the measured costs be prospective. Furthermore, while it is possible to
more fully allocate embedded costs to different services, the exercise
involves considerable speculation due to the fact that the accounting data
lacks the level of detail required for making such a determination in the
first place.

In lieu of reforming their accounting procedures to more fully account
for service-related costs, the Bell System advocated basing pricing
decisions on forward-looking cost studies. In numerous proceedings, "Bell
presented evidence that long-run incremental costs were the only
economically and valid standard for ratemaking purposes .... ,70 Ironically,
given their pejorative characterization of TELRIC and their contention that
a forward-looking costing methodology fails to accurately measure their
costs, 7'

the RBOCs, other large ILECs, and their respective economic
consultants, have also been long time advocates for the use of forwardlooking cost estimates for ratemaking purposes. 72

Citations from a symposium sponsored by the National Regulatory
Research Institute in 1990 support this Article's contention that economic
costs regularly have been used for pricing decisions. George W. Costello,
Bell Atlantic's Executive Director of Service Costs wrote that "forwardlooking incremental costs [are] the appropriate pricing floor on which to
base pricing decisions. 7 Costello asserted that embedded costs should not
68. Id. at 1384.
69. See SANFORD V. BERG & JoHN TSCHIRIIT, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRAcncE 91-100 (1988).

70. Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof at 384, AT&T (No. 741698). As far back as 1975, some telephone companies advocated for the use of current cost
in ratemaking. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 1, 29 (October 22, 1975) (noting
that New York Telephone Company endorses the principle of current cost pricing for what it
calls vertical services).
71. See Brief for Petitioners' Regional Bell Cos. and GTE, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC (8th
Cir. July 16, 1999) (No. 96-3321).
72. In a 1997 Connecticut proceeding on unbundling issues, Southern New England
Telephone (SNEI) went so far as to opine that the total service long run incremental cost
(TSLRIC) methodology remains "the most appropriate [methodology] for encouraging an
effective competitive environment." DPUC Investigation into the Southern New England
Tel. Unbundled Loops, Ports and Associated Interconnection Arrangements and Universal
Serv. Fund in Light of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, No. 96-09-22, at 12 (Conn. Dep't Pub.
Util. Control April 23, 1997).
73. George W. Costello, Determining the Economic Cost of Actions Requiring
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be used for pricing decisions because it would result in "non-economic
[sic] and inefficient pricing policies."74 Costello expressed concern that the
misuse of embedded data for pricing decisions could "irreparably
handicap" local exchange companies.75
At the symposium, BellSouth explained how it estimated the long-run
incremental cost of the loop. The cost estimates were produced "to support
state-wide pricing of various services utilizing loop facilities."7 BellSouth
explained how it used capacity costing concepts, a method not unlike the
TELRIC methodology adopted by the FCC in 1996: "The cost of each item
of equipment, whether it be cable, multiplexers or fiber optics, is developed
by dividing the full investment by the expected utilized capacity." 7 The
type of equipment used in BellSouth's cost study was determined by the
company's planned, not historical, network: "It is assumed that the network
engineer will build outside plant facilities in the most economical manner
for the company's array of services by selecting the most economically
efficient technology. ' 78 This effectively meant that the company would
assume service over a type of facility that may have rarely been in use at
the time the cost study was conducted. For example, the study assumed that
customers located more than twelve thousand feet away would be served
by digital line carrier,79 even though the vast majority of these customers
were served by copper cable.
As a final example, consider the writing of Richard Emmerson, an
economic consultant that has worked for a number of local exchange
companies. At the symposium, Emerson stated that questions regarding
such issues as "What [c]osts will be caused by proposed changes in
tariffs?", or "What costs will be imposed on the LEC by more intensive use
of a network component?...

can only be determined using incremental

costing methods."' In the concluding section of his paper, Emerson stated
that "[i]t is unambiguous in economics and the history of regulation that
incremental costs be employed to govern telephone company behavior
Regulatory Review in MARGINAL

COST TEcHNIQUES FOR TELEPHONE SERVICES: SYMPOSIUM
PROCEEDINGS 666 (William Pollard ed. 1991).

74. Id at 676.
75. Id. at 679.
76. James L. Johnson & Peter F. Martin, A Practical Model for Estimating the

Incremental Cost of Local Exchange Loops, in

MARGINAL COST TECHNIQUES FOR
TELEPHONE SERVICES: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 50 (William Pollard ed., 1991).

77. Id at 56.

78. Id. at 59 (footnote omitted).

79. See id at 78.
80. Richard D. Emmerson, Theoretical Foundation of Network Costs, in NATIONAL
REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MARGINAL COST TECHNIQUES FOR TELEPHONE
SERVICES: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 147 (William Pollard ed. 1991).
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(whether self governed or regulated)."''
Courts have also accepted the use of incremental cost pricing. In MCI
v. AT&T,2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that AT&T did not
practice predatory pricing because its prices exceeded the long-run
incremental cost of production. The court defined long-run incremental
costing as "the average cost of adding an entire new service or product
rather than merely the last unit of production."' ' Thus, the court found rates
to be compensatory since they covered the economic cost of production.
Given the history supporting the use of incremental costs for judging
the reasonableness of rates, it is extraordinarily paradoxical that the RBOCs
and the large independent phone companies are now arguing that "[u]sing a
reproduction-cost methodology like TELRIC is strangely anachronistic.""
It seems that it is the RBOCs sudden conversion to the use of historicalcost methodologies that is "strangely anachronistic" and inconsistent in
light of the evidence of their long advocacy for the use of incremental costs
in making rate determinations.
Furthermore, the ILECs' suggestion that the reasonableness of rates
can only be judged with reference to embedded costs, and that the FCC's
advocacy of TELRIC over historic costs is inconsistent with past FCC
practices, is contrary to the position taken by the ILECs in price-cap
proceedings during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the course of those
proceedings, the telephone companies contended that there was no need for
regulatory commissions to rely on rate-base, rate-of-return proceedings to
judge the reasonableness of their rates. Indeed, in state proceedings the
ILECs pointed out that in 1988 the FCC found that there was no need to
base rates on the embedded cost of service. For example, New Jersey Bell,
in its request to the state commission for replacing rate-base regulation with
price caps, cited the following passage from the FCC's Price Cap decision:
The Communications Act mandates that rates for interstate
telecommunications common carrier services be just, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory [sic]. However, while the statute requires that "we
execute and enforce [its] provisions," and provides us with an array of
regulatory powers, both specific and broad, it does not compel [the
FCC] to utilize a rate-of-return methodology or any other particular
regulatory model in fulfilling our statutory obligations. Rather, courts
have consistently found in the Act a congressional intent to grant [the
FCC] broad discretion in selecting regulatory tools. Our "broad
discretion!' specifically includes "selecting methods.., to make and
81. Id at 189.
82. 708 F.2d 1081, 1115 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,464 U.S. 811 (1983).

83. Id.
84. Brief for Petitioners' Regional Bell Cos. and GTE at 23, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC
(8th Cir. July 16, 1999) (No. 96-3321).
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In doing so, we may make any "reasonable

'5
selection from the available alternatives."
."

B.

Concerningthe Propositionthat OtherMethods-Embedded
Costs,Ramsey Pricing,or ECPR-Be Used in Placeof TELRIC
Justice Breyer noted that the FCC had not adequately explained why
the use of• Ramsey Pricing or
86 the efficient component pricing rule would be
arbitrary or unreasonable. This Part briefly addresses some of the
limitations associated with these two pricing schemes.
As explained by Justice Breyer, "Ramsey pricing is a classical
regulatory pricing system that assigns fixed costs in a way that helps
maintain services for customers who cannot (or will not) pay higher
prices. '' More specifically, Ramsey pricing uses price demand elasticity
estimates to determine the relative mark-up above marginal cost for
different services."' First, it is paradoxical that Justice Breyer would
suggest this may be a superior method relative to TELRIC for pricing
services. For, as with TELRIC, Ramsey pricing uses estimates of forwardlooking, not embedded costs, as a basis for setting prices. There is no
substantial difference in the methodology used to estimate marginal and
TELRIC costs other than the quantity demanded. Both type of cost studies
require an analyst to make certain assumptions about the cost of current
and future technologies, as well as the level of demand.
The crucial distinction between Ramsey and TELRIC pricing is the
former's use of elasticity of demand estimates to determine the amount of
common costs which should be recovered from different products. This
added information requirement has made Ramsey pricing of little practical
use in any regulated industry. In a review of the record, Huettuer stated that
Ramsey "principles are yet unused by virtually every regulatory agency in
the [United States]."
In a more recent survey of the contributions made by economists to
private industry and government agencies, Gerald R. Faulhaber and
William J. Baumol pointed out that until recently, Ramsey pricing was

85. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, New Jersey Board of Regulatory
Commissioners, 143 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 297, 313 (N.J. Bd. Reg. Com. May 6, 1993)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
86. See AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 752, (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
87. 1&at 752.
88. See BERG & TSCHIHART, supranote 69, at 55.

89. David A. Huetmer, Optimal Second Best Pricing of CATV Pole Attachments, 48 S.
ECON. J. 996-97 (1982).
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given little attention by regulators. ° They were pleased to report that in a
"landmark decision" of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the
agency considered adopting Ramsey pricing. The ICC rejected the pricing
rule after noting that "Ramsey pricing... requires both the marginal cost
and the elasticity of demand to be quantified for every movement in the
carrier's system." 91 The information requirements of such an undertaking
"seemed overwhelming," and therefore it was "too difficult and
'
burdensome for universal application. 92
Justice Breyer also stated that the FCC has failed to support its claim
that the use of the efficient component pricing rule would be
unreasonable. 93 The theoretical shortcomings of the efficient component
pricing rule are well known,' and, like Ramsey pricing and TELRIC,
requires an estimate of the forward-looking economic cost of service.' This
Article, however, merely identifies one practical problem with using it for
pricing unbundled network elements.
With the adoption of price caps, some regulatory commissions have
explicitly or implicitly set retail rates for incumbent local exchange carriers
that were intended to encourage ILEC infrastructure investment. State
regulatory commissions decided to improve the cash-flow of some
incumbent local exchange carriers in order that they would have funds
available for building a modem, broadband network. If not for the decision
by the state commission and legislatures to promote infrastructure
investment by the incumbent local exchange carrier, the retail prices would
have been lower.96
90. See Gerald R. Faulhaber & William J. Baumol, Economists as Innovators:Practical
Productsof TheoreticalResearch,49 J. ECON. Lrr. 577, 594-95 (1988).
91. Id. at 595 (citation omitted).
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. See AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 751 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
94. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection
Pricing:How Efficient Is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule"?, 40 ANTrmusT BULL.
557,557 n.1, 558-70.
Economides and White provide the following definition of the ECPR:
The ECPR states that the appropriate access charge by the bottleneck monopolist

to the providers (actual or potential) of a complementary component or service,

which the monopolist also produces (and thus the other providers are rivals to the
monopolist), is a fee equal to monopolist's opportunity costs of providing the

access, including any foregone revenues from a concomitant reduction in the
monopolist's sales of the complementary component.
Id. at 559.
95. Under ECPR, the price for an unbundled network element is equal to the
incremental cost of providing the element plus the foregone net revenue that the monopolist

loses when the rival obtains the network element. See id. at 562.

96. See, e.g., Clouser v. Bell Atlantic-Penn., Inc., No. P-00930715, 82 Pa. P.U.C. 194
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The ECPR uses as a starting point the retail prices of the incumbent.
If ECPR is used to set the price of unbundled network elements, the
entrants that order unbundled network elements will be required to fund the
roll-out of the incumbents more modem network. This subsidy is not
competitively neutral and therefore violates the 1996 Act's objective of
promoting competition.
V. PRESENTATION OF THE ARMIS DATA: AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF TAKINGS IN TWENTY-ONE JURISDICTIONS
The findings of Hope, reaffirmed by the Court in Dusquene, arguably
define an equity owner's interest as an interest in return on investment that
is "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the
enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital."' This Part
analyzes that return on investment.
The literature concerning the 1996 Act and the issue of deregulatory
takings, as well as the ILEC petitions to the court concerning the FCC's
rulemaking procedures implementing the Act, are strikingly devoid of any
data that supports the view that TELRIC prices are confiscatory.
The large telephone companies, citing Electricity Consumers
Research Council v. FERC,9' have argued that the reasonableness of a
methodology can not be judged solely on the underlying theory. Rather the
justness of a rate should be tested by the presentation of substantial
evidence.99 The large telephone companies have also claimed that the
justness of the rates should be based on an evaluation of the regulated
earnings of local exchange carriers. They claim that the FCC's adoption of
TELRIC rates leave incumbent LECs no leeway to recover even their
actual operating costs, never mind the constitutionally required fair return
on investment.1°°
A.

Company Returns
This Article presents data on the profitability of selected incumbent
LECs subsequent to the passage of the 1996 Act. The companies included
in this sample are those companies that are, arguably, the firms that may
experience the greatest harm from TELRIC-based prices for unbundled
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n June 28, 1994).
97. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
98. 747 F.2d 1511, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
99. See Brief for Petitioners' Regional Bell Cos. and GTE at 58-59, Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC (8th Cir. July 16, 1999) (No. 96-3321).
100. See id.
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network elements. These companies have been required to provide local
loops on a deaveraged cost basis.
The local loop is the most difficult facility for any potential
competitive local exchange carrier to replicate. 10 The construction of a
wire-line network requires a large amount of irreversible capital, and
therefore entry is risky.'0 Furthermore, there are economies of scale in the
provision of the loop because of the fixed costs of digging trenches and
installing conduit.' Consequently, unless an entrant can obtain a sizeable
share of the market, it may incur higher unit costs.
Incumbent IECs opposed deaveraging because they believed that
unless retail rates were deaveraged simultaneously, it "would wreak havoc
on the rate structure, allowing massive arbitrage.' ' °4 One witness for an
ILEC provided the following example of how arbitrage would occur:
Assume that the monthly price of a deaveraged loop in a high density
urban area is $10 per loop, and that the monthly price of a deaveraged
loop in a low density rural setting is $40 per loop. Also assume that the
average retail rate for business basic exchange service (IFB) is $32 per
month. Given this scenario, in high density urban areas, a CLEC such
as AT&T will purchase $10 unbundled loops in combination with
other elements to make a finished service, which would cost less than
paying the lFB resale rate ($32 less the avoided costs). However, in
rural areas, a CLEC will not purchase unbundled loops at the high
price of $40; instead, the CLEC will purchase average-rated IFB
101. See Pricing Proceeding for Interconnection, Unbundled Elements, Transport and
Termination and Resale, Eighth Supplemental Order; Interim OrderEstablishingCosts for
Determining Prices in Phase II; and Notice of PrehearingConference, No. UT-960369,
para. 13 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1998).

102. Sunk or irreversible costs deter entry because they increase the risk associated with
entry. Incumbent firms have a strategic advantage if the entrant must incur costs that are not
part of the forward-looking opportunity costs of the incumbent. These additional costs
create a barrier to entry because the incumbent firm's opportunity costs are lower than the
entrants and, therefore, he will be able to underprice his potential rival. See WLLiAm J.
BAUMOL Er AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY

STRUcTURE 282

(1982).

"Most loop installations involve the use of technology for which the recoverable value
of the facilities is quite low. Much of the cost of installation is associated with the actual
labor effort and the machinery that is used to install the copper or fiber cable. For example,
Pacific Telephone estimates that 59% of the loop costs are sunk." Rulemaking on the
Commission's Own Motion to Govern open Access to Bottleneck Services and Establish a
Framework for Network Architecture Development of Dominant Carrier Networks, Interim
DecisionSetting FinalPricesfor Network Element Offered by PacificBell, Rulemaking 9304-003, at 22 n.20 (Ca. Pub. Util. Comm'n Apr. 7, 1993).
103. See Implementation of Local Competition, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, pars. 11, 169, 232,

316, 340, 679,4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).
104. Reply Testimony of Irene G. Chavira at 27, Interconnection Contract Negotiations
Between AT&T Comm. of the Mountain States, Inc. and U S WEST Comm., Inc. Pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 252, (N.M. State Corp. Comm'n Mar. 27, 1997) (No. 96-41 1-TC).
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service on a resale basis, since it can be purchased at a lower rate ($32
less the avoided costs).
The net result of this would be the loss of support from low-cost
geographic areas to high cost geographic areas-with no way to make
it up. This situation, where unbundled rates are deaveraged and retail
rates are averaged, simply allows the contribution which now flows
from urban customers to0rural
customers to flow into the pockets of
5
AT&T and other CLECs.1
The New Mexico State Corporation Commission rejected this
witness's argument and instead found in this and other proceedings that the
wholesale rates for unbundled loops should be deaveraged: "It is the intent
of the [1996] Act that the price of unbundled network elements be based on
the economic cost of service. Therefore, U S WEST should deaverage its
rates into three density groups."'10
Table 1 in the Appendix provides data on the deaveraged rates for
loop as a UNE, established in New Mexico and twenty other states. It only
shows data for states that have deaveraged their rates because these are the
states, according to the incumbent local exchange carriers, that are most
likely to be harmed by setting the price of loops based on the economic
cost of service' 0 7
In Table 1, the columns indicated as (1) through (4) show deaveraged
forward-looking costs by population density zone. Column (5) shows the
average UNE loop price. Column (6) shows the 1997 embedded cost of
loop. Columns (7) through (9) show returns on regulated net investment for
the years 1996 through 1998.
The data shows that the New Mexico Commission, as well as other
state commissions, have established deaveraged unbundled loop prices that
can be less than the average embedded cost of service. The embedded cost
may be higher than the forward-looking cost because technological change
is lowering the cost of providing the loop, or because of differences in the
105. Id. at 46.
I06. Interconnection Contract Between AT&T Comm. of the Mountain States, Inc. and
U S WEST Comm., Inc. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252, Findingsof Fact,Conclusions of Law
and Order, No. 96-411-TC, at para. 135 (N.M. State Corp. Comm'n Mar. 20," 1997); see
Petition by Brooks Fiber Comm. of New Mexico, Inc. for Arbitration of the Rates, Terms
and Conditions of Interconnection with U S WEST Comm., Inc., Pursuant to Section 252(b)
of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Orderon Motionfor Rehearing, No. 96-337-TC, at para. 9
(N.M. Corp. Comm'n Feb. 1997); Petition by American Comm. Servs., Inc., and Its Local
Exchange Operating Subsidiary for Arbitration with U S West Comm., Inc., Pursuant to the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, No. 96-307-TC, at para. 72 (N.M. State Corp. Comm'n Dec.
1996).
107. AT&T submitted the rate data to the FCC in an exparte filing made in CC Docket
No. 96-98. See Letter from AT&T to Magalie R. Salas, Secretary, FCC, attachment (Mar. 2,
1999) (on file with the Federal Communicationslaw Journal).
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methods used to calculate the embedded and forward-looking cost
estimates. For example, the embedded cost of service is based on a
composite rate of return of 11.25%,'08 an amount that exceeds the rate used
by state commissions in most arbitration proceedings by approximately one
hundred basis points.'09 Furthermore, the embedded cost of the loop
includes the cost of connecting and disconnecting customers from the
network. In the arbitration proceedings, separate nonrecurring charges are
established to recover these costs. Consequently, the unbundled loop price
is not designed to recover certain loop costs that are included in the
embedded cost of service."10
As can be seen from Table 1 in the Appendix, the majority of
companies are earning returns on regulated investments that are above the
FCC 11.25% composite rate-of-return. Furthermore, if the set of the 150
largest telephone companies are considered, Table 1 shows that these firms
are also earning returns which are greater than the FCC's authorized rate of
return, 11.25%. If the FCC's composite rate of return ensures the
maintenance of financial integrity, returns in the range indicated in Table 1

are more than adequate to ensure that the investment-backed expectations
of public utility investors are being met.
This position is further bolstered by noting that the return reported in
the last column is a composite return that has a debt and equity component.

Assuming a rate of 7.58% for long term debt,' and an equity/debt mix of
75/25 to 60/40,112the equity return of a firm, such as Ameritech, Illinois, on
108. See NECA, UniversalService FundLoop Cost and Expense Adjustment Algorithms,
Oct. 1, 1998, at line 23 (on file with the FederalCommunicationsLaw Journal).
109. The New Mexico State Corporation Commission has used a rate-of-return of 10.72
in its arbitration proceedings. See Interconnection Contract Between AT&T Comm. of the
Mountain States, Inc. and GTE Southwest, Inc. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252, No. 97-35-RC,
at para. 90 (N.M. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1997).
110. The recurring rate of the unbundled loop is designed to recover the recurring cost of
the loop. It is economically efficient to recover the nonrecurring expenses from the carrier
that requests that a loop be connected or disconnected, rather than bundling this cost into the
recurring price of the loop. By establishing separate charges, the cost of connection and
disconnection is recovered from the party that causes society to incur the cost. The reporting
of both recurring and non-recurring expenses in the embedded number highlights again how
embedded cost data was not designed for the setting of rates. While the underlying of data
exists which permits a cost analyst to segregate recurring and nonrecurring expenses, as
with a forward-looking cost study, a special study must be undertaken in order to obtain this
information.
111. See Telephone Company Bond Rates, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at B3 (New
England ed.) (listing long-term debt rates).
112. Telephone companies contend the range is appropriate. State regulatory
commissions, however, have generally opted for a higher debt mix. See Petitions for
Approval of Agreements and Arbitration of Unresolved Issues Arising Under § 252 of the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, No. 8731, at 23, 29 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 22, 1997);
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its embedded investment was somewhere in the range of 35% to 42% in

1998.
Given the rates of return on regulated investment, and the rates of
return on embedded investment, it seems clear that the majority of

telephone companies in the survey are earning returns that are more than
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of their enterprises,
maintain their credit worthiness and to enable them to attract additional
capital."' Based on this data it would seem that the ILECs and their

supporters' contention, that use of the TELRIC methodology, on its face,
results in a taking, is not grounded in the reality depicted by their earnings
reports. The Fifth Circuit Court recognized this in a recent decision:
GTE claims that implementing the forward-looking cost methodology
will force ILEC's to operate at a loss, and this constitutes an
unconstitutional taking under Brooks-Scanlon. GTE's claim has no
merit; it has not shown that a taking has occurred or that any taking
or would be so serious as to be considered
will be permanent
, 14
"confiscatory. "

B.

The Stranded Cost Issue
The ILECs have argued that implementation of the FCC's pricing

rules will "strand" their historical costs. One of the arguments they have

used to support this position is that state regulatory commissions, trying to
keep local rates low, have traditionally dictated artificially lengthy
depreciation schedules that do not accurately reflect loss of value due to
obsolescence. For that reason, ILECs' books often reflect "'reserve
deficiencies:' they carry existing equipment on their accounting books at a
higher value than what it would cost to buy new equipment today."' 15 This
Implementation of the New Rules Related to the Rural Telecommunications High Cost and
Low Income Components of the New Mexico Universal Service Fund, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, No. 96-310, at paras. 219-242 (N.M. State Corp. Comm'n
July 15, 1998).
113. In their Brief, the ILECs argue that losses on UNEs may not be subsidized by
profits from other competitive services. This argument is spurious because the companies
have made no showing that the TELRIC prices are below cost. See Brief for Petitioners'
Regional Bell Cos. and GTE at 60, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC (8th Cir. July 16, 1999) (No. 963321).
114. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 413 n.14 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Dusquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989)).
115. Brief for Petitioners' Regional Bell Cos. and GTE at 12, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC
(8th Cir. July 16, 1999) (No. 96-3321). The Michigan Public Service Commission has
defined the "depreciation reserve deficiency" as "the difference between that depreciation
reserve maintained on the company's books and that which would have been accrued had
the actual service lives and salvage values been known at the time the asset was placed into
service." Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 77 P.U.R.4th 535, 537 (1986). In competitive markets,
when the book value of a firm's assets exceeds its market value, the excess capitalization is
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is a spurious argument. The limited available market data clearly shows
that the book value of the ILECs assets is significantly less than the market
value of the assets."1 6

Recent market sales information indicates that exchanges are being
sold for more than book value. For example, GTE sold its 213,651
domestic access lines in Arkansas to CenturyTel, Inc., for $843.3 Million,

or approximately $3,947 per line.1 7 GTE's total 1998 Net Plant in Service
Investment,
net of depreciation, was $327.5
•
118
- or booked investment
million. This works out to, approximately, $1,533 per line. So, GTE's
Arkansas exchanges sold for about 2.6 times their 1998 book value, hardly
an indication of a stranded cost problem. u 9 in 1998, GTE sold 58,723 lines

in Nebraska for $204 million or approximately $3,470 per line. The booked
investment on those lines was $55.2 million.'2 Hence, in this situation,
GTE's lines sold at approximately 3.7 times their book value.
As another example, an analysis performed on the effect of the recent

merger between Southern New England Telephone (SNET) and SBC
indicated that "[t]he implied market value of SNET's intrastate assets of
$3.305-billion [sic] is approximately 1.8 times the $1.477-billion [sic] book
value of SNET's intrastate assets." 121
The fact that the ILEC exchange assets are commanding prices on the

open market which are of a magnitude greater than their book value vitiates
the ILECs' contention that implementation of TELRIC will result in
normally written off as a stockholder loss.
116. There is limited data available on the market value of the assets. In most
jurisdictions the market price of the sold exchanges is not disclosed.
117. See Telephony, COMM. DAILY, June 30, 1999, at 7.

118. See Joint Application at ex. 1, Joint Application of GTE Southwest Inc., GTE
Arkansas Inc., and GTE Midwest Inc. for Authority to Sell and for CenturyTel of Northwest
Arkansas, LLC, and CenturyTel of Central Arkansas, LLC to Acquire Certain Assets and
for Relinquishment of Certain Rights Under Certificates of Pub. Convenience and
Necessity, No. 99-220-U (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1999).
119. Other data, while less comprehensive, indicate that LECs are selling their assets for
a multiple of the book value. For example, on August 19, 1999, GTE Corp. announced the
sale of 126,410 access lines to Telephone USA of Wisconsin LLC and CenturyTel, Inc., for
$365 million. See Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 20, 1999, at 7. This is equivalent to
$2,887 per access line. In 1998, GTE average net book investment per line was $1,135 for
its 478,106 lines. GTE is only selling a portion of its 478,106 lines. Nevertheless, the limited
publicly available data indicates that the sale price is considerably higher than its book
investment. This provides further support for our contention of a lack of a taking.
120. See Telephone Interview with John Burvanis, Accountant, Nebraska Public Service
Commission (Sept. 15, 1999).
121. Direct Testimony and Exhibit of Lee L. Selwyn and Susan M. Bawin ex rel. State
of Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel at 93, Joint App'n of SBC Comm., Inc., and
Southern New England Telecomms. Corp. for Approval of a Change of Control, No. 98-0220, (Conn. Dep't Pub. Util. Control May 7, 1998).
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stranded costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1996 Act championed the creation of competitive
telecommunications markets. In reaching that goal, the FCC developed
several rules including the unbundling of elements and element prices
based on TELRIC forward-looking costs. This forward-looking approach is
in stark contrast to typical embedded cost-pricing approaches. Not
surprisingly, the ILECs have argued that such a switch would lead to an
unlawful taking on the part of regulators.
This Article makes several points related to this issue. First, over the
last one hundred years there have been other switches in rate base valuation
methodologies. In the most recent switch, the Supreme Court was asked in
Hope to determine whether converting from fair value-based pricing to
prudent investment based pricing constituted a taking. The Court's opinion
was clear. It would not review the valuation method as long as "the total'
effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable."'
Applying the Court's logic to the current controversy, it seems that
TELRIC should not be unacceptable as long as the effects of TELRICbased prices are not unjust and unreasonable.
This Article's second point takes that unjust and unreasonable
approach one step further. The focus is on a sample of twenty-one
jurisdictions where UNE prices are TELRIC-based and deaveraged across
density zones. In each jurisdiction, retail prices reflect value of service
pricing to varying degrees, so there is ample room for cream skimming by
competitors. Looking at the return on regulated net investment for the
ILEC in each jurisdiction, the results indicate that in two-thirds of the
jurisdictions, the return was above the FCC's composite rate of return.
Hence, under the Court's standard as enunciated in Hope, TELRIC-based
prices are not unreasonable. However, as competition evolves, these returns
may change. Nothing prevents review at a later time under new situations
and a reexamination of TELRIC pricing.
This Article's final point relates to the implementation of TELRIC
versus other pricing standards for UNEs. This Article discussed three
alternative methods of pricing network elements. The most familiar method
relying on embedded costs, is not practical because the accounting financial
system was not designed to provide the type of information needed for
pricing decisions. The other two options, ECPR and Ramsey pricing, have
much greater information requirements than TELRIC. Like TELRIC, at the
122. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
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outset the analyst must estimate the forward-looking cost of production.
But, in addition, with Ramsey pricing the analyst must have available
demand elasticity data. This information does not generally exist and
regulatory commissions have not implemented Ramsey pricing in part due
to the absence of such data. ECPR also requires a significant amount of
additional data. The analyst must be able to quantify the forgone revenuea difficult task because such a calculation requires an estimation of the
cross-elasticity of demands between unbundled network elements, access
charges, and retail prices. Again, this information is not available. Another
advantage of TELRIC pricing is that it encourages efficient use of
resources. TELRIC pricing allows efficient entry because competitors can
obtain access to the network at a price that reflects the cost to society of
making the resources available. Arguably, it was this view of competition
that Congress envisioned when it passed the 1996 Act.
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